View: India, revise the nuclear doctrine

India's 22-year-old nuclear doctrine, based on 'no first use' and 'credible minimum deterrence', faces urgent re-evaluation. With aggressive neighbors rapidly expanding arsenals and rejecting NFU promises, the current policy risks unilateral disarmament. Modern warfare's speed and evolving threats necessitate a clear, updated doctrine to safeguard national interests.

No one watching the world's first nuclear test near Alamogordo, New Mexico, in July 1945 could have imagined today's times when nine countries—openly or quietly—possess more than 12,200 nuclear warheads. At least two nations host foreign nuclear weapons.

The stockpile was much larger during the Cold War when just two countries—US and the erstwhile USSR— possessed over 68,000 warheads, with global stockpiles exceeding 70,000.

The current 12,200 warheads have enough power to end human civilisation many times over.

But surprisingly, only six of the nine countries have a clearly documented nuclear doctrine. Others hide behind deliberate ambiguity (Israel), let policy shift with the whims of a single leader (North Korea), or leave it to the mood of the army chief of the day (Pakistan).

In this new reality, India's nuclear doctrine, announced in January 2003 and unchanged for 22 years, feels like from a different era. That doctrine was born out of a specific trauma— Operation Parakram of 2001-02, when India mobilised half a million soldiers after the Parliament attack, only to pull back because Pakistan rattled its new nuclear sabre.
From that bitter experience, we drew two comforting principles: keep the arsenal small but survivable (credible minimum deterrence) and swear to never use it first (no first use or NFU). For two decades those words gave us a moral high ground and a sense of restraint, but the world did not stand still.

The neighbourhood has turned far more dangerous and aggressive, knowing that India may bow down to their nuclear blackmail. Our adversaries openly reject the very rules we follow.

There are several reasons why it is time for a serious rethink of India's nuclear doctrine.

CHANGED NEIGHBOURHOOD
When India announced its doctrine in 2003, we had two nuclear neighbours. While Pakistan had about 30-40 warheads, China had around 200-250 at that point of time. Today, Pakistan has 170 and China has over 600, with plans to reach 1,000 by 2030. Both are expanding rapidly. While Pakistan follows a policy with no NFU limitations, China has specifically kept India out of its NFU ambit.

In October 2024, China's arms-control chief Sun Xiaobo told UN that Beijing's NFU promise applies only to the five permanent members of the Security Council. In plain language: China now reserves the right to nuke India first if it ever feels threatened.

In April 2025, Pakistan's Railways Minister Hanif Abbasi openly threatened that suspending the Indus Waters Treaty could trigger a nuclear exchange, reminding the world that “all 170 Pakistani warheads are pointed towards India”.
Pakistan recently passed its 27th Constitutional Amendment, which centralises its entire nuclear command under the Chief of Defence Forces, giving it absolute control over nuclear deployment. This not only enhances the risk for India but also raises catastrophic global concerns.

When both its adversaries publicly reject the very principle on which India's doctrine rests, clinging to it looks less like high moral ground and more like unilateral disarmament.

DIFFERENT ERA
Now, wars are no longer month-long affairs. The recent, 88-hour, IndiaPakistan flare-up (Operation Sindoor) showed that conflicts can be lightning fast. Similarly, the presence of hypersonic missiles, AI-driven cyberattacks, exo-atmospheric kill vehicles and armed drones in modern-day battlefield have shrunk reaction times from hours to minutes.

A surprise decapitation strike has the capability to destroy command centres much before prime minister even authorises retaliation and, in such an environment, the old promise of “assured massive retaliation” after absorbing a first strike sounds heroic but no longer practical.

Our second-strike capability is no longer guaranteed. Our nuclear submarines and mobile missiles are good steps toward survivability, but these are still few. A coordinated first strike with use of modern tech could blind our early warning systems, jam communications and take out airfields and submarine bases in the opening hours. They can also hit our command centres governing the use of nukes while global pressure to “show restraint” would kick in immediately as we saw during Operation Sindoor. Under such circumstances, there are serious questions about India's promised “massive retaliation”.

DETERRENCE PROBLEM
India has roughly 180 warheads. Pakistan has 170, but many are lowyield tactical weapons designed for battlefield use. China has 600+ and is growing fast. In a situation where your adversary can absorb “massive retaliation” and still have a few hundred warheads left, the word “minimum” loses its meaning.

Pakistan's doctrine openly talks of using tactical nukes on Indian troops inside Pakistan's territory if it fears defeat in a conventional war. That poses the question, do we really wait for a battlefield nuke to land on our soldiers much before a retaliatory response?

INDIA'S GLOBAL ROLE
In 2003, we were a rising power. In 2025, we are the fourth largest economy in nominal GDP. Smaller countries look to India as a security provider. When Indian peacekeepers are in Africa, when Indian warships escort merchant ships in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, when Indian vaccines reach 100 nations, our responsibilities turn global.

A doctrine written only to deter Pakistan (and China) no longer matches the India we are now.

CHANGED WARFARE
China has a 10-tonne non-nuclear bomb that can flatten several city blocks in one go. This is roughly the destructive power of a small tactical nuclear weapon, but entirely conventional. Pakistan is believed to possess “dirty bombs” (conventional explosives wrapped with radioactive material) which are as deadly as a nuclear bomb. India's current doctrine is silent on how we respond if such weapons are used against our cities or troops.

In 2003, the nuclear triad was still a dream. Today we have submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, canisterised Agni-V with MIRV warheads, hypersonic test vehicles on the drawing board, and drone swarms as part of our battlefield strategy. Direct energy weapons, kinetic kill vehicles and electronic warfare are the new norm.

Several countries like Russia have autonomous platforms capable of delivering nuclear weapons tens of thousands of kilometres away. Space-based weapons are being conceptualised. All these new systems and other futuristic weapons need clear rules of engagement with respect to their use and authority. The 2003 document simply doesn't answer these questions.

CONTINUING TERROR THREAT
For 40 years Pakistan has waged a serious proxy war against India. It has been living up to its policy of death by a thousand cuts. The recent Pahalgam attack and the attempted Red Fort bombing remind us of a threat which has not gone away.

If a major terrorist strike is traced back to state actors and causes hundreds of deaths, India's hands should not remain tied simply because of its policy of no first use. Many experts feel that a doctrine that ignores asymmetric warfare is totally incomplete.

WHAT INDIA SHOULD DO
No one wants reckless sabre-rattling. A revised doctrine does not mean abandoning all restraint. What is needed is that India must clearly define its red lines without any ambiguity for catastrophic terrorism. At the same time, India must also seriously consider expanding its arsenal.

This should be articulated with a publicly known, regularly updated doctrine so friends and foes alike know exactly where India stands.

Nuclear weapons are horrible. Every sane Indian hopes they are never used. But when your adversaries are openly lowering their thresholds, expanding arsenals and excluding you from their NFU promises, sticking to a 22-year-old doctrine is a great risk.Add as a Reliable and Trusted News Source Add Now!

Source: EconomicTimes
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